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DONALD LANGEVOORT*

CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
The Impact on Director and Officer Behavior

As WE GO DOWN THE TABLE, I SUSPECT WE ARE ALL GOING to be reframing a lot of
points already made rather than making new ones, and I confess that is what I am
about to do.
I fall on the side of the skeptics about whether criminal liability in financial
reporting cases is a healthy tool because I have doubts about whether judgments
are likely to be proportionate. And proportionality is a very important measure in
criminal law for two reasons. First, we expect the punishment to fit the crime as a
matter of justice. Secondly, if we have disproportionately harsh treatment, then the
behavior of officers and directors in response to over-deterrence is that they will
pay too much attention to matters that are precautionary as opposed to profitgenerating. I And the point of a business is to be entrepreneurial. That is a fairly
familiar point, but worth emphasizing.
Why do I say proportionality is going to be problematic? I think there are three
layers of ambiguity in any complex criminal trial that is likely to lead to judge or
jury decision-making that imagines something rather than assesses it accurately.
One is ambiguity as to the motive. It is very easy in hindsight to say "look at the
stock options-that was the motive for the financial misreporting." That suggests
greed, and so that is a very salient story about motive. But my sense is that there are
often many motives. Looking at many of these scandals, the companies were in a
desperate growth and/or survival mode during the times they engaged in financial
misreporting. 2 Yes, the growth was fueled by options plans but, in fact, internally
there was also a perception that there was going to be a shake out in their industry
in three years, and if they were not one of the winners, they were not going to be
around. They were in part, at least, doing it for their shareholders. That is a very
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 511-12 (2001) (stating that officers/directors will expend resources to engage in monitoring practices to the extent the cost of such expenditures is less than the gain in terms of liability). The logical
extension is that where over-deterrence exists, the officers/directors will spend more time and resources on
precautionary measures.
2. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2002, § I, at 1; Carrie Johnson & Christopher Stern, Adelphia Founder, Sons Charged; Family Looted SixthLargest Cable TV Company, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at AI; Simon Romero, Worldcom Facing
Charges of Fraud: Inquiries Expanded, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at AI.
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different motive, and far less venal. That would not excuse a crime, but it changes
the emphasis, and hence one's assessment of what went wrong.
A second ambiguity relates to the so-called "badges of guilt."3 That is a famous
evidentiary point. Judges and juries look for certain things that tell them this was
bad, this was evil-and the person accused of the crime obviously knew it. Concealment, secrecy, little bits of deception are traditional markers of fraud. 4 But, of
course, in a highly competitive business environment, the way you compete is often
by deceiving your competitors as to matters such as research and development and
marketing plans. Business people make it a natural part of their strategy not to
show all their cards all the time. More importantly, they believe that you win by
not showing all your cards. In hindsight, then, lack of candor is often very easy to
find. But this often just shows business norms at work, and does not necessarily
prove fraudulent intent.
Finally, there is the ambiguity of harm. If we ever took seriously the notion that
we want to see a proximate link between what the defendant did and the alleged
harms (for instance, $30 billion of losses to Enron investors),S we would have to
admit that there were many causes, and isolating anyone is bound to be misleading. In fact, $30 billion may itself be a misleading way of looking at losses. But a
number like that grabs a jury's attention.
I think when you put these three ambiguities together, the likelihood that you
are going to have truly "proportionate" decision-making is minimal.
My final point just connects to Michael [Klausner's]. I think we have had a failure in the civil enforcement system, and that is what has put so much pressure on
criminal law to respond. It is not because the law hasn't provided for good civil
remedies. For forty years or so, the SEC has the power to seek disgorgement of any
ill gotten gains from any individual wrongdoer. 6 1t is not that they cannot, it is they
have not always gone aggressively after the individuals as opposed to the company.
One reason for this is because they settle their cases and, just as we talked about
earlier, it is much easier to settle with other people's money, (i.e., the shareholders)
than it is to settle based on an executive's real money out of pocket. It takes a
politically committed prosecutor or plaintiff to say I am going to take a risk rather
than pursing the path of least resistance. You did not always see that from the SEC.
If the government had historically done a better job in the civil area I think a lot of
the pressure would be taken off. The SEC is getting better about this, but it is a
fairly recent phenomenon.

3. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1997-99 (2006).
4. See Murphy v. Crater (In re Crater), 286 B.R. 756, 764 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (categorizing the traditional "badges of fraud" into three types-the first type being concealment and deception).
5. Bank of America to Pay $69 Million to Settle Enron Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2004, at C2.
6. Matthew Scott Morris, Comment, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990: By Keeping Up With the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151,
168 (1993).
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